Justin Smoak, 20 March 2009

Does Michael Young have a realistic shot at 3,000 career hits?
-- Maggie W., Burleson, Texas

Yes. Young, who turned 33 last October, has 1,662 career hits. Hall of Famer Paul Molitor, comparable as a hitter to Young, had 1,561 hits in eight full seasons after turning 33. Craig Biggio had 1,380 hits in eight seasons after turning 33. But there are also many players who had numbers similar to Young at this point in his career and ultimately fell well short of 3,000 hits. So much depends on Young staying healthy because physical issues have kept him from getting 200 hits in each of the past two seasons.

Two weeks later, Evan Grant of the Dallas Morning News expanded on Young-for-3,000 possibility with comparisons to Barry Larkin, Craig Biggio, Julio Franco, and, most notably, Paul Molitor.

For my part, I began examining the likelihood of Young reaching 3,000 hits soon after Sullivan’s article, then let it slide because of my real job. Once Grant added his two cents, I hurriedly finished my research for a March 1st post. Nope… work and Cat Search 2010 consumed another week. So, at last…

Here’s the 3,000 Hit Club minus Cap Anson, whose inaugural season predates the National League and ended in 1897:

The breakdown of their careers indicates several serious obstacles to Young’s attempt to join them:

1. Recall that Young did not join Texas as a fully assembled 200-hit machine. Drafted as a 20-year-old out of UC Santa Barbara, he needed nearly a full season at each level of the minors above rookie-ball. Aside from a tiny sip of coffee in 2000, Young’s Major League career didn’t commence until 2001, his Age 24 season. During 2001-2002, his Age 24 and 25 seasons, he batted a meager .257/.304/.390. He spent April 2002 time-sharing second base with Frank Catalanotto, after which Little Cat’s shift to four-corner super-sub initiated Young’s seven-year quasi-Iron Man streak.

The late and tepid start is obviously problematic. Wade Boggs is the only member of the 3,000-hit club to collect his first hit during his Age 24 season. The average age was 20.7, the median 21. The non-Boggs contingent accumulated an average of 462 hits before their Age 24 seasons. Others with relatively modest starts were Wagner (81), Lou Brock (115), Tony Gwynn (149), and Paul Waner (180).

2. Because of the above, Young’s 1,662 hits through his Age 32 season trail every member of the 3,000-hit club at the same stage in his career. Closest are Craig Biggio (1,680), Paul Molitor (1,751), and Honus Wagner (1,751).

3. On average, members of the 3,000-hit club collected 1,267 hits subsequent to their Age 32 season. Young needs 1,338, a figure that only seven of the 26 members attained. Thus, even among this group of baseball’s most elite hitters, Young must perform better than average.

4. If Young wants to achieve 3,000 hits before turning 40, he’ll need to average 191 for the next seven seasons. In the near future, he has a reasonably good chance to do so. Come mid-decade, he’s bucking ridiculous odds. Only three players have achieved the more economical sum of 160 hits during their Age 37, 38 and 39 seasons: Pete Rose, Tris Speaker, and Sam Rice (who actually didn’t reach 3,000). The combination of bat speed, stamina and good health at that age is extraordinarily rare.

So, given the unfavorable comparisons with those who achieved 3,000 hits, let’s examine Young in terms of the subsequent performance of players with similar careers through Age 32. I compiled a list of all hitters with at least 831 hits (one-half Young’s total) by the age and created a least-squares ranking using hits through each player’s Age 32 season, starting age of career, hits per game, and batting average. I also included (with less emphasis) batting average on balls in play, rate of walks plus HBP, and isolated power, all of which help to eliminate batters with extremely dissimilar hitting profiles. Without them, the list includes strange comparables like Jeff Bagwell.

A handful of the closest comparables (Jack Tobin, Babe Herman) were already done as regulars by the time they turned 32, so I manually deleted them. Everyone on this list qualified for the batting title for at least one more season, almost always more. Finally, I deleted active players. (Okay, the listed Garret Anderson is still active. But not very.) Note that this list isn’t akin to Bill James’s Similarity Scores. I’m not seeking the Young’s best overall matches, just for a specific set of characteristics.

The most similar 25, in order:

Note: A "Good" season in the table signifies at least 100 plate appearances and a batting average and on-base percentage above the park-adjusted league average.

Both of Sullivan’s comparisons and most of Grant’s appear on my list. Barry Larkin’s 190 fewer hits than Young, higher walk rate and “poor” .306 BABIP (because he struck out so infrequently) create a slightly less valuable comparison in my system. What I take from this set of players:

1. Three of Young’s 25 most similar hitters reached 3,000 hits: Molitor, Bagwell, and Lou Brock. As noted, all began their Year 33 seasons with more hits than Young.

2. Among those most similar to Young, only seven reached 2,500 hits, and five actually departed with less than 2,000. A search on “Bob Meusel,” famous for following Ruth and Gehrig in the Yankee lineups of the 1920s, reveals the epithets “lazy,” “indifferent,” and “unpopular,” three words never appended to Young. Meusel’s last good season came at Age 31, and by 33 he was done. Meusel aside, most of these players reached their mid-thirties in respectable form, but very few remained healthy and effective thereafter.

3. The average batter collected only 706 hits after his Age 32 season. Molitor (1,568) and Biggio (1,380) are dramatic outliers and the only two listed to surpass the 1,338 hits needed by Young.

4. Young will be fulfilling the final year of his five-year, $80 million contract as a 36-year-old. 12 of the 25 hitters most similar to Young failed to accumulate enough plate appearances to qualify for the batting title in their Age 36 seasons. That is to say, they were hurt, ineffective, or (in a few cases) already retired.

Michael Young has the second-most hits in baseball during the last seven years (trailing Ichiro). Better yet, his 1,416 hits during his Age 26-32 seasons are the sixth-most in MLB history, the others in an illustrious top ten being Heinie Manush, Boggs, Puckett, Rose, Harry Heilmann, Musial, Carew, and Rogers Hornsby. Despite those accomplishments, he’s highly unlikely to reach 3,000. Bill James’s “Favorite Toy” tool grants him an 18% chance. With no disrespect to Young, I would give those odds.

Meet Ranger, just rescued from Austin's Town Lake Animal Shelter. Yes, he's sleeping on one of those giveaway Ranger blankets.

Texas will win a World Series during his lifetime. Perhaps several.

The combination of treatment and lesser expectations apparently weren't enough to bring Greene back onto the diamond. This would be an exceptionally lousy way to lose a career, so best wishes for his recovery.

Meanwhile, Joaquin Arias lives! Suddenly, he's the best backup shortstop in camp, as Esteban German has barely played there in the minors and Ray Olmedo is Ray Olmedo. Arias has a genuine shot, his last shot, at flying to Arlington at the end of March. I'd say it's no worse than 50/50 that the Rangers trade for a 5th infielder before Opening Day. (If you're getting this on RSS, I'm two days late. Accidentally posted it as a "draft.")

Courtesy of Bing Crosby, Danny Kaye, Rosemary Clooney, Vera Miles:

One disappointment for another, as Texas relinquished the nearly assured blandness of Mayberry for the potential of Golson. Mayberry (19th overall, 2005) showed impressive power but otherwise failed to improve during his steady ascent through the minors. He’s never hit for average or drawn many walks, and at 25, his upside is limited. Philadelphia added him to its 40-man roster.

Golson (21st overall, 2004) likewise hasn’t advanced as hoped. Though a fine baserunner with moderate home-run prowess, his production is sabotaged by an atrocious batting eye that hasn’t improved an ounce in four years. Chris Davis might survive with a 5:1 ratio of strikeouts to walks. Golson won’t. He’s two years younger than Mayberry, can play center field, and is far toolsier. The Rangers win if they can instill in him some selectivity at the plate. A tall order.

Golson’s removal from the 40 seemed a bit odd in terms of roster management. He still has an option, whereas shortstop Joaquin Arias is optionless and has an employer that acquired/re-signed no fewer than four backup infielders during the offseason (Greene, Inglett, German, Olmedo). That said, the Rangers indicated what lay in store for Golson when they let him cool his heels in September and instead retrieved AA center fielder Craig Gentry from AA.

Hilligoss is a shortstop who has moonlighted at third and first, positions at which his bat appears totally unsuited. Regarded as an intriguing hitter out of Purdue in 2006, he hasn’t cracked AA in four professional years and posted a dire .239/.286/.299 across two seasons in the Florida State League (which is pitcher-friendly, to be sure, but not nearly enough to rescue that line). He turns 25 in June and doesn’t rank among Texas’s top 50 prospects.

The Rangers have 104 pitcher-seasons of at least 25 starts. Colby Lewis’s 2003 ranks last in ERA (7.30), ERA+ (69), opposing on-base percentage (.402) and opposing slugging (.550). In 2004, he underwent surgery for two tears in his rotator cuff. In the subsequent three years he was waived twice and released twice. He spent the last two seasons in Japan.

And with this resume, the cash-strapped Rangers guaranteed him $5 million? Stupefying. Terrifying.

No, no, no. Just kidding. While the first paragraph is factually correct, it glosses over two superior years overseas. During Lewis’s initial venture in Texas, the respectable control exhibited in the minors vanished on the mound in Arlington. In Japan, Lewis walked or hit less than 5% of opposing batters while fanning 26% and leading the league in strikeouts in both seasons. That won’t translate directly to the US, of course, but Lewis has apparently learned to pitch rather than throw. He also employs a cutter, that favored pitch of rotation mates Scott Feldman and Tommy Hunter. There’s considerable upside to this deal, particularly in the form of a $3.25 million club option for 2012 should Lewis pan out. If he flops, Texas appears to possess some supra-replacement-level pitching depth. Plan B is not Elizardo Ramirez or even Luis Mendoza. Also, with payments to A-Rod, Little Cat, and three others ceasing after 2010, having to eat Lewis’s 2011 salary becomes more palatable, if need be.

(Interestingly, Lewis and pitcher Ben Kozlowski were teammates with Hiroshima in 2008-2009, several years after being lost on waivers by Texas within days of each other in October 2004.)

Inglett was/is a marginal candidate for the 25-man roster, so outrighting him to Oklahoma City now (assuming he clears waivers) really doesn’t significantly affect his status. He’s a pretty darned good backup 5th infielder, and I don’t mean that as a backhanded compliment.

Only 16 hitters populate Texas’s 40-man roster, and that includes dead-man-walking Joaquin Arias.

I'll go ahead and let the bitterness flow forth so I can move on. No need to write anything new. To quote myself...

On my site, February 2004, regarding the trade of Alex Rodriguez, which doesn't mention the owner specifically but applies nonetheless:

An absolute disaster, and as stark of admission of organization-wide failure as can be imagined. Placing Rodriguez on waivers might have made more sense. Had Texas merely swapped Rodriguez for Soriano straight up, they could have excused the deal as a pure salary dump. But remarkably, Texas will contribute $67 million to the $179 million due to Rodriguez. Texas will pay Rodriguez $3 million this season, $6 million in 2005 and 2006, $7 million in 2007, $8 million in 2008, $7 million in 2009, and $6 million in 2010. Also, Texas will pay the entirety of Rodriguez's remaining deferred salary of $24 million, the payments of which were pushed out five more years and at an annual rate of 1.75% compared to the 3% in the original deal.. Adding in the remaining $4 million of his signing bonus and the $12 million in deferred salary accrued from 2001-2003, the Rangers will pay Rodriguez $83 million spread over the next 22 years.

For all this, Texas gains the ever popular "financial flexibility," a term of art that means little without the wherewithal to use it properly. In 2004, this newfound flexibility is a moot point, as the time to sign worthwhile free agents has long since passed (unless Greg Maddux loses his marbles and decides that several summers in Arlington would be a fine way to close a career). This season, practically all of the savings not spent on Soriano will rest contentedly in Tom Hicks's wallet.

Rodriguez did Hicks quite the favor by opting out of the final three years of his contract. Still, the new owners will pay $3 million to Rodriguez in 2010 -- the last of his deferred signing bonus -- which I believe finally closes that sordid book.

What I wrote in the Hardball Times annual, 2008:

Amidst these and previous management shakeups is team owner Tom Hicks. Though not impetuous in the manner of vintage-period George Steinbrenner, Hicks seems to institute a new five-year plan every other year or so. Some examples: 1) fired GM Doug Melvin two years after Texas won its third division title in four seasons, by far its most successful era; 2) signed Alex Rodriguez to a ten-year deal, then traded him three years later; 3) gave former GM John Hart license to spend freely after 2001, then instituted an aggregate payroll cut of over $30 million that lasts to this day; 4) fired assistant GM Grady Fuson two years and nine months into a three-year “internship” for the GM spot; 5) gave manager Buck Showalter a three-year extension following 2004, then fired him before it kicked in; and 6) hired a 30-year-old Ivy Leaguer as GM, then hired the older, old-school Nolan Ryan as his boss two years later.

Fuson's drafts turned out to be barely qualified disasters. 2002 produced virtually nothing beyond Kameron Loe. Unless Eric Hurley recovers, 2004's top pick will be Brandon Boggs. Also, Ryan and Daniels have co-existed better than I expected.

Nevertheless...

Team Record, AL West, 2000-2009:
LAA  900-720
OAK  890-728
SEA  837-783
TEX  776-884 

With two years, 140 days of MLB service time, Nippert gained "Super 2" arbitration status by exactly one day. That extra day is worth almost $250,000. Nippert pitched inconsistently in 2009, as always, but with enough of the variance on the happy side to be pretty useful. He's a dark-horse rotation candidate, more likely a mop.

The Rangers avoid arbitration, as is their wont, but accede to doubling McCarthy's pay despite his 97 innings and 4.62 ERA (4.70 FIP). Projection systems expect similar results in 2010. Yee-haa.

Texas will pay Vlad $5.5 to $6.0 million in 2010 and an undisclosed salary or a $1 million buyout in 2011. Guerrero can also decline the option sans buyout.

I’m trying and failing to envision Guerrero wearing a blue cap emblazoned with a white “T.” Guerrero has murdered the Rangers for six seasons running. Even during 2009, his worst as a regular, Vlad batted .404/.433/.579 against the Rangers. Simply not having him as an opponent is worth a few million.

Past and present Dallas Morning News scribe Evan Grant compares and contrasts Guerrero to notable free-agent flop Richard Hidalgo, concluding: “Vladimir Guerrero is not Richard Hidalgo.” Quite so. Hidalgo was a great hitter for exactly two seasons, while Guerrero has the 6th-best OPS+ among active players. Still, they both dove off a cliff prior to signing with Texas:

Hidalgo:
1999-2003: .277/.360/.511
2004: .239/.301/.444
2005: .221/.289/.416 (with Texas)

Vlad:
2004-2008: .323/.387/.557
2009: .295/.334/.460
2010: ???

(Incidentally, Hidalgo, who hasn’t played in the Majors since 2005, is only four months older than Guerrero and still attempting a comeback.)

2009 was Guerrero’s worst season since 1998. Once a fearsome hitter, capable runner, and rifle-armed outfielder, Guerrero has declined sharply of late, suddenly unable to play the field competently and occasionally looking lost at the plate. Per Fangraphs, 2009 was his first season since at least 2002 that didn’t produce favorable results against fastballs, and his ratio of homers to fly balls dipped precipitously. Guerrero’s skill set doesn’t (or didn’t) portend a rapid decline in production, but not everyone ages gracefully. Witness 2009 reclamation project Andruw Jones.

Guerrero definitely fills a hole at DH; he’s not pushing the next Edgar Martinez back to AAA. Prior to his signing, Texas’s optimal solution against lefties was David Murphy, either as DH himself or in the field while giving another outfielder a “half day off.” Versus lefties, against whom Murphy flails, Texas had… Max Ramirez? Brandon Boggs? A still-germinating Justin Smoak? A reserve infielder?

Bill James envisions a strong rebound for Guerrero (.305/.369/.508, not park-adjusted, I assume) while CHONE is more circumspect (.291/.334/.460) in projecting a repeat of 2009. There is also the non-zero probability that Guerrero is toast. Happily, Texas’s most advanced hitting prospects, Smoak and Ramirez, are precisely to type who could replace Guerrero at DH if they shine in AAA while he falters. Guerrero’s a worthy signing at a reasonable price, with a fair amount of upside and downside.

Texas also signed infielder KHALIL GREENE to a one-year contract for $750,000.

And Joaquin Arias’s wafer-thin chance at a Major League paycheck just evaporated. The Rangers previously re-upped with Esteban German and nabbed Joe Inglett off waivers from Toronto. Both reasonable maneuvers, but neither answered the question (except derisively, perhaps) of who would back up for Elvis Andrus.

The answer is Greene, who’s been chasing his very promising rookie campaign for five years. Over the years, he’s drawn few walks, his extreme fly-ball tendencies have swallowed his batting average whole, and UZR thinks ever more unkindly of his defense. Thus, instead of cashing in on his first winter as a free agent, he’s accepting a one-year deal for less than double the league minimum. Greene is due for improvement, I suppose, inasmuch as it’s really hard to hit just .217 on balls in play. He played some third in St. Louis and will probably spell Kinsler at second also.

Last New Year's Day, Courtney and I were roused from sleep by the sounds of Jack suffering a tonic-clonic seizure. He survived, barely, but the long-term prognosis was poor. During several months of thrice-daily anti-convulsant medicine, he recovered about 80% of his pre-seizure agility. He enters 2010 healthy and med-free. Go, Jack.

If a prospect is highly regarded enough to play in a High-A league at the tender age of 19, how much does his actual performance there matter? Are the better hitters in High-A more likely to reach the Majors and stay there, or is simply being a High-A youngster indicative of future success?

I ask because of Engel Beltre, the toolsy center fielder Texas acquired as part of the Eric Gagne trade in July 2007. He was a consensus top-10 prospect in Texas’s newly-loaded system that offseason. (I ranked him lower than anyone at 12th, which looks prescient now but was just dumb luck on my part.) After a 2008 in Low-A Clinton filled with highs (.283 average, 43 extra-base hits, 31 steals) and lows (2% walk rate, several early removals for not obeying coach instructions), he still maintained status at the lower end of the top 10. Texas’s modus operandi for many of its prospects is to place them at the highest level possible, and each prospect’s goal is to prove that he’s not overwhelmed. Thus, Beltre jumped to High-A Bakersfield in 2009 despite a season that encouraged more Low-A seasoning.

The 19-year-old Beltre backslid, hitting only .227/.281/.317. He maintained his prowess on the basepaths and drew a few more walks, but the rest of his game declined. On May 28th, a walk and hit-by-pitch improved Beltre’s line to .249/.308/.359. That was his apex. Afterwards, he batted a meager .205/.255/.273 through mid-July, when a broken bone in his hand more-or-less ended his season (aside from a handful of September at-bats in AA Frisco).

So, to what extent does Beltre’s dreadful 2009 matter? In an attempt to answer this question, I’ve compared Beltre to his peers: batters achieving substantial playing time in High-A at the age of 19. There aren’t many of them. Between 1992 and 2006, only 96 19-year-old batters collected enough plate appearances to rank in the top 100 in a High-A league. That’s just over six per year and only about 2% of all qualifying batters.

I created a table for these players with a gaggle of statistics: the basic “slash” stats, average on contact, rates for homers, all extra-base hits, walks and strikeouts, and a modified version of Bill James’s Speed Score. I then rated each stat for each player in comparison to the league average for his particular year, and then ranked all the players from top to bottom. (FWIW, as a backup, I also ranked the players using linear weights and ended up with essentially the same rankings.) Finally, I tabulated each player’s Major League plate appearances. For my purposes, how well the player performed in the Majors isn’t critical; the length of the career alone is largely indicative of performance.

For ease of comparison, I split the 96 players into a top half and bottom half based on performance. In my system, Beltre ranks 31st among 42 Cal League batters with at least 250 PAs since 1992. Which is to say, well within the bottom half. I classified the players’ MLB careers (or lack thereof) as follows:

• Free Agent (3,000+ Plate Appearances) – The player lasted long enough to reach free agency. Not everyone in this category is quite there (e.g., Grady Sizemore), but close enough.
  
• Regular (500-2,999 PA) – The player was a regular for at least one season or a heavily used backup for several.
  
• Long Look (150-499 PA) – The player almost certainly received some playing time outside of September roster expansions, but not enough to play regularly for more than a few months.
  
• Cup of Coffee (1-150 PA) – The player received a handful of at-bats, likely during September.
  
• None (0 PA) – The player never reached the Majors.

The results:

Over one-half of the best performers became MLB regulars, and 75% donned the uniform for at least one day. Conversely, along the worst performers, less than one-quarter became regulars, and less than one-half ever earned a Major League paycheck. For some season, the Florida State league was far more forgiving to the bottom halfers. I’d guess that’s just a vagary of a small data set.

In rough terms, 19-year-old batters in the top half were twice as likely to reach the Majors, and also twice as likely to have lengthy MLB careers.

Here’s the players with their MLB plate appearances:

Perusing the list reveals several active players who are likely to move up to a higher category. Not coincidentally, they’re mostly in the “top half” group. Hardy, Cabrera, Loney, Butler, Jones, Barton and Pie have varying probabilities of reaching 3,000 PAs. Texas’s own Joaquin Arias can escape prospect limbo by winning the backup infielder job next spring. Among the bottom-halfers, only Alcides Escobar and Ryan Sweeney have a chance at a lengthy career.

Again, Engel Beltre’s 2009 rests comfortably in the bottom half. It’s not a death knell for his MLB dreams. Keep in mind that nearly 50% of the worst 19-year-olds made the Majors. That’s awfully impressive. Nevertheless, being in the bottom half definitely puts a damper on expectations. In late March, after hearing the words every Texas minor leaguer dreads – “you’re repeating Bakersfield” – Beltre will work on becoming the next Torii Hunter instead of the next Tony Mota.

I voted for Dellucci's game-winner in 2004. Nothing else comes close.

Regardless, what an awful decade.