Route 66 near Seligman, Arizona, 24 March 2008

With PitchFX, we can examine the relationship between his pitch location and opponents’ success at the plate. In this case, I’m focusing solely on balls hit into play (including homers), of which there are 75. One was a bunt single, and two have no pitch data, leaving 72 balls for study.

Caveat: Hurley hasn’t pitched enough to generate respectable sample sizes. I’m doing this exercise because I think it’s interesting, but how he’s performed so far doesn’t necessarily portend his future.

The split between high and low pitches is exactly 36:36. As shown in the graph, a few hitters have hit a ball into play on a pitch higher than the top of the strike zone, while no hitter has done so on a pitch below the bottom of the zone.

1. What type of pitch is crossing the plate high or low?

As expected, most of the high pitches are fastballs, and the low pitches contain a heavier proportion of sliders.

2. Are high pitches resulting in more fly balls?

Yes. The vertical midrange of the strike zone of hitters faced by Hurley is 2.52 feet. At 2.60 feet is a pretty strong delineation in fly ball tendency:

The ratio for all pitches is 22% grounders, 22% line drives, 48% outfield flies, and 8% infield flies.

3. Are high pitches resulting in more hits?

More home runs, yes (two on high strikes, one low). More hits, no. Opponents are batting a meager .194 when making contact on high strikes and a robust .389 on low strikes. The corresponding slugging percentages are .389 and .667.

What’s hurting Hurley most so far is a 31% line drive rate on low pitches. Opponents are batting .727 and slugging 1.000 on those liners, which sounds absurdly high but is actually near the average for the league.

Conversely, opponents are also hitting only .130 (3-for-23) on fly balls on high pitches. He’s also generated four infield flies (nearly as surely an out as a strikeout) on high pitches, only one on a low pitch.

So, Hurley should ditch the slider and concentrate on heat up in the zone where it’s safe.

Just kidding. Hurley can’t expect to turn 87% of high-strike flies into outs in the long run. Several pitchers (for example, Scott Kazmir, Rich Harden, Scott Baker, Jered Weaver) are succeeding with very low ground ball rates, but they also have extremely high strikeout rates (Kazmir, Harden) or are no worse than above-average both in walks and Ks (Baker, Weaver).

At present, Hurley has a respectable walk rate (7.4%) but a below-average strikeout rate (12.6%), and 70% of his balls in play have been liners or outfield flies. Despite his 3.57 ERA, that’s a pretty toxic brew. He’ll need some combination of more strikeouts and more grounders to succeed in the long run.

Brian Gordon

Brian Gordon

Jason Ellison

Jared Hyatt, with Chris Shelton in background

Jason Ellison, Kea Kometani and Taylor Teagarden (top to bottom)

Taylor Teagarden and Wes Littleton

How Wilson ranks when facing his first batter:

Based on a comparison of Wilson's peripheral stats to the other 32 relievers, the following closers are having seasons most similar to Wilson in 2008 (from most to least simlar):

J. Isringhausen
R. Franklin
B. Wilson
G. Sherrill
J. Valverde
M. Corpas
B. Ryan
S. Torres

And the least similar relievers:

M. Rivera
J. Soria
B. Morrow
J. Papelbon
B. Wagner
J. Nathan
B. Lidge
B. Jenks

Regarding Wilson’s personality: His flamboyance and occasional indifference to PR protocols will always make him an outsized target of affection when he’s performing well. Conversely, when he’s faltering, his comments/hair/hobbies/etc. will face extreme ridicule. This can be expressed algebraically as follows:

P = Performance [range of 0-10, 5 = average]
WL = Wilson Love [infinitely positive or negative, measured in picocuries]

WL = ( P – 5 ) x Modifier,

where Modifier > 1

I have yet to define this modifier numerically. It might be exponential rather than multiplicative.

Tommy Hunter

Tommy Hunter

Tommy Hunter

Tommy Hunter

Joaquin Arias. He left the game after playing the field for one more inning.

Emerson Frostad, homering in his first AAA at-bat.

Nelson Cruz

Chris Shelton sliding, John Mayberry giving instructions.

Pitching coach Andy Hawkins, Hunter, Frostad (and lonely fan).

Nelson Cruz (and Edwin Maysonet)

Taylor Teagarden

Teagarden

Teagarden

John Mayberry

Steve Rowe

Teagarden, pitching coach Andy Hawkins, Rowe

If you are bringing up a Chris Davis... shouldn’t it be as an everyday player? Does that make sense, even if holding them out at times against certain pitchers is also acceptable? But if there is a thought, or if the minor league stats show Davis might struggle a tad with lefties, then keep him in OKC to face those lefties, and not have him sit for those up here. Any doubt that creeps into Davis’ mind that he might not be trusted against lefties is a doubt that absolutely should not be there at this stage of a career.”

Chris Davis’s splits in 2008:

Davis's BB/SO ratio has broken down against lefties this season. The rest is peachy. If Davis is having self-esteem issues versus lefties, he's hiding them well.

Idle thought: Under this philosophy, would Hank Blalock (lifetime .224/.279/.345 versus lefties) ever have become a Major Leaguer?

“Why is [Brandon Boggs] up here, playing maybe twice a week, when the kid shows definite potential? Boggs has been an asset for the Rangers when he has played, but is he benefiting in the long run from all the sitting?”

Boggs has never appeared in fewer than three games in any seven-day period:

Frisco, Texas, 16 May 2008

By design, Hurley drew the worst offense in the American League as an opponent. The Royals have scored fewer than four runs per game and against righties are batting .256/.306/.368 with a 6% walk rate. Still, they’re not the New Orleans Zephyrs. Hurley made some mistakes and was duly punished. That said, Hurley showed admirable poise on the mound, worked efficiently, and often lived up to his considerable potential.

The magic of pitchFX encourages (nay, demands) excruciating detailed analyses of his performance. Let’s go:

Pitch Types and Movement:

After leading off with 15 consecutive fastballs, Hurley mixed in a slider and occasional changeup. He threw 68 of 92 pitches for strikes and didn’t walk a batter. Here’s his pitch selection with speeds and strike percentages:

The next chart displays the movement of each pitch relative to a ball thrown without spin. This particular chart doesn’t show pitch location, just movement.

On the vertical axis, a positive number represents a the ball that doesn’t descend as much as a spin-free throw. A negative number indicates more drop. On the horizontal axis, a negative number indicates the ball tails toward a right-handed batter or away from a lefty swinger.

The backspin on fastballs retards their downward descent, so they show more vertical “rise,” and they usually tail into a right-handed batter (if thrown by a righty like Hurley). Sliders tend to cut away from righties and have minimal rise. Some pitchers’ sliders have extra downward movement in a “slurvy” fashion, but not Hurley’s. Indeed, his sliders often gave the appearance of rising upon release before snapping leftward. (Note that nobody’s pitches actually rise.) A curve, if Hurley threw one, would show up below the slider, indicating the most downward movement.

Vertical Location:

Hurley clearly favored the upper part of the strike zone, particularly with fastballs. I constantly read of how he’s attempting to locate more pitches on the lower part of the plate, but only 10 of his 59 fastballs touched the lower third of the plate or below. Furthermore, most of them don’t look like failed efforts to aim low. Plain and simple, he’s gearing up and throwing a standard “rising” fastball.

Horizontal Location:

Away, away, away. 31 of Hurley’s pitches missed on the outside part of the plate compared to just six inside. The umpire’s slightly off-center strike zone might have played a role in Hurley’s location.

Lefties Versus Righties:

Hurley threw more sliders than fastballs to right-handed batters, taking advantage of the slider’s tail away from the hitter. Against lefties, he focused on the fastball. All ten of his changeups were to lefties. The charts reconfirm his efforts to work the outer part of the plate. (Note: This chart and all that follow are displayed as if the viewer is the catcher looking toward the pitcher. A right-handed batter would stand on the left side of the chart. Anything within the “rulebook” strike zone is absolutely a strike. The wider zone is 2.8 inches (about the width of the ball) and represents everything that could (and probably should) be a strike. PitchFX isn’t perfect, and neither are umpires, so there’s some leeway in this zone.)

Results by Batted Ball Location:

The ground/fly data in a box score only refer to outs, and they characterize a harmless pop-up to the catcher no differently than a fly ball caught on the warning track. Hurley’s fly tendencies were on uncomfortably clear display. Excluding the bunt, 75% of Kansas City’s batted balls were outfield flies or line drives. Even in consideration of the two homers, he could have fared worse.

Results by Pitch Type:

Hurley’s ability to throw strikes and induce bad swings with his slider was most impressive. This is described in the next table. Conversely, batters swung at 27 fastballs and made contact (in play or foul) with all but two.

The next charts display pitch locations and results by pitch type.

The fastball chart shows his tendency to work high and occasional control lapses. The two hits within the “rulebook” strike zone were home runs. Sometimes, as on those pitches, his fastball tended to float more than break. I didn’t create separate charts for batter handedness, but I should note that the umpire was squeezing Hurley a little on fastballs in toward left-handed batters and giving him an extra two or three inches on the outside part of the plate.

The slider is another story. The couple of them didn’t slide, and one slid too much, but on the whole it was his most effective pitch.

Hurley’s changeup was all over the place. That said, he didn’t suffer any damage from it.

Fastball Velocity:

Hurley’s 1st-inning fastballs rarely exceeded 90. During the last four innings, only one of his fastballs failed to surpass 90. He steadily touched 92-93 after the 2nd and showed no apparent fatigue.

"[Yonder] alonso or [Ethan] martin. texas will select one of them. that's my guess. don't think crow or hosmer will be around."

An odd move, if not a consequential one. I wasn’t a big fan of German’s procurement of a roster spot, and he hasn’t pitched as well as his 2.08 ERA would suggest. That said, he’s been an adequate back-end to the bullpen. Also, I thought the point of a seven-man bullpen was to avoid the need for roster shuffling like this. Despite last night's blowout, Texas has five relievers capable of pitching tonight.

Loe hadn’t distinguished himself in AAA. He’s pitched a little better than his 5.14 ERA indicates, but aside from a nice 6.5% walk rate, his peripherals are ordinary. Frankly, I think Loe himself would be a candidate for assignment if the Rangers needed room on the 40-man roster (they don’t).

[Ramon] Vazquez is common thread as Texas Rangers win 4th straight:

[Vazquez] is a .251 career hitter. He has below-average power. When the Rangers found him last year, he hadn't played in more than 52 major league games in three seasons. He was supposed to be the extra infielder on a team where the infielders played every day.

Be that as it may, facts can't dispute this: When Ramon Vazquez is in the Rangers' lineup, they are a winning team… Since he joined the Rangers last May when Hank Blalock needed surgery to improve blood flow to his right arm last season, the club is 63-54 when Vazquez plays; 52-44 when he starts.

Indisputable. And meaningless. To reiterate:

For a statistic to have meaning and value, it must have uniform applicability. For example, one can calculate batting averages for all hitters, compare them, and learn something meaningful about the players. Thus, for the difference in the team’s record with and without [Vazquez] to have meaning, the difference must also apply logically to other players.

Since the beginning of 2007, Texas has a record of 52-44 (.541) when Vazquez starts and 36-61 (.371) when he doesn’t. That’s a huge difference, obviously. Notably, Vazquez has replaced oft-injured Hank Blalock in most of his starts. Here’s where you end up when you apply the “team-record theory of value” to Blalock:

Blalock is common thread as Texas loses 7th straight:

Blalock seems to have recovered from the off-years of 2005-2006. He batted .293 with ten homers in 58 games last year, and .299 with three homers in 22 games this year before pulling up lame.

Be that as it may, facts can’t dispute this: When Hank Blalock is in the Rangers’ lineup, they are a losing team… Since the beginning of 2007, the club is 31-49 when Blalock plays, 30-48 when he starts.

The team record with versus without Vazquez is nothing but luck. During the last two years, the Rangers have allowed 4.86 runs per game in Vazquez’s starts and 5.78 in his off days. Vazquez wasn’t around when Texas began 2007 with a 15-26 record. This year, Blalock, not Vazquez, took the field in each of three starts by Luis Mendoza (9.31 ERA). In Jason Jennings’s six starts (8.56 ERA), Vazquez has appeared twice, Blalock four times. Vazquez didn’t play during the seven-game meltdown at Boston and Detroit.

Michael Young says that Vazquez " is one of the smartest guys I've ever played with. He does all the little things well. He knows how to handle every situation." Even stipulating that Vazquez might be more valuable than his hitting and fielding stats indicate, he’s not the difference between a .541 team and a .371 team (about 28 games per season).

If a player hangs around long enough, the team record in his games will converge with the team record in all games. Some players are worth more than others, of course, but even the difference between an MVP-level player and a backup infielder is only 10-12 games per year. The variance in “Team Record with Player X” is so high that comparisons among players are meaningless. Accepting such comparisons can lead to bizarre conclusions; for example, Ramon Vazquez is more valuable than Hank Blalock.

Incidentally, Jason Botts is (was) a career .230/.325/.344 hitter with Texas, but the Rangers had a 44-33 record when he started. Look at those intangibles! I can’t believe Texas let him go.